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THE CLOSE CORPORATION AND THE NEW
NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS
•CORPORATION ACT
E. R. LATTY*
Capp and Skill have worked out a business idea that has prospects
of paying off handsomely. Skill has the essential technical talent for the
venture but little capital. Capp has the capital as well as considerable
general business experience; he is also in a fairly high income tax
bracket. The arrangement that Capp and Skill want between themselves
is about as follows: Capp is to put in a designated amount of capital,
considerably more than Skill; Skill is to give his full time to the business;
Capp is to give substantially his full time, subject to such time as he
needs to keep an eye on his other business interests; Capp is to be gen-
erally in charge of the routine of office personnel and outside contacts,
while Skill similarly is to have jurisdiction over technology and produc-
tion; no major policy decision is to be taken without their mutual agree-
ment; in particular no salary can be fixed without the concurrence of
both; each is to get a designated salary; net profits, over and above their
salaries, are to be divided 60% for Capp and 40% for Skill; the arrange-
ment is to last so long as both of them are able properly to perform their
respective duties. Also, it is agreed that Capp's son will be employed
by them at a designated salary and that Skill will teach Capp Jr. the
inside know-how of the technology.
In a partnership, all these reasonable arrangements (as well as fur-
ther details to round out the picture) can easily be worked out by an
agreement of partnership which does not leave Skill to the mercy of
dominant control by bigger partner Capp and which does not subject
Skill to Capp's power to amend their basic mutual contract by virtue
of Capp's majority interest. But Capp and Skill are very anxious to get
limited liability; indeed, Capp will not go into the venture without it.
The only feasible form of business organization to achieve this goal seems
to be the corporation.1
When they turn to the corporate form of organization, will they find
the typical state corporation law well adapted to their arrangement?
* Professor of Law, Duke University Law School.
'Even in a limited partnership or "Massachusetts trust" the owner-management
group will be personally liable except, in the case of the business trust at least, in
so far as contract creditors agree to look only to the business assets for payment of
their claims. UNIFORm LIMITED PARTNERSHip Acr §7; Anno., 156 A. L. R. 22,
165-169 (1945). As for alternatives like the "partnership association" in a few
states, see infra p. 456.
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What they will probably find is a corporation law that was drafted with
the publicly held corporation in mind and which, unless they are ex-
tremely careful, automatically casts them into a mold wherein the
minority shareholder is at the mercy of the dominant shareholder, who
as a practical matter can swing both the board of directors and share-
holders' action. The typical corporation law seems to prescribe a repre-
sentative form of government, with administration of the affairs of state
vested in a central policy board to be periodically elected (or rejuve-
nated) by the theoretically democratic process of majority vote, which
board in turn must be free to choose the law-prescribed officers and to
contract for the services of the executives to whom the active manage-
ment and executive functions are delegated. In such a corporation, it
would be unthinkable to let one shareholder (or worse still, the holder
of one share) defeat the wishes of the rest (and, presumably, the best
interest of the corporation) with respect even to fundamental changes
like amendment of the basic contract, amalgamation, transformation,
dissolution, liquidation. Accordingly corporation laws permit even such
major changes in the enterprise to be accomplished by majority vote or
by some percentage short of unanimity. Also, in such corporations,
there is something perhaps to be said (but the point is open to argument)
for reducing the shareholder's rights down to the point where about all
he has left is a right to cast a ballot for directors, to vote on certain
fundamental changes, to inspect certain records and to bring a stock-
holder's suit for maladministration; hence let the law prescribe the scope
of management's powers, rather than leave it a matter of contract among
the associates.
All this structure of representative government in the typical cor-
poration law is about as appropriate for a two-man get-together as
Robert's Rules of Order.
A quick look at a few judicial decisions from different jurisdictions
will illustrate the point.
1. Benintendi and Dondero owned all the stock of a hotel corporation,
Benintendi having the smaller portion. To give Benintendi a partner-
like check on majority shareholder Dondero, they had the corporation
adopt three by-laws which required respectively: (1) unanimity for all
shareholders' resolutions, (2) unanimity for election of directors and
(3) unanimity for all directors' actions. In an action by Benintendi to
have the by-laws declared valid and to enjoin their violation it was held
that the by-laws were invalid.2 Unanimity for shareholders' resolutions
was held to violate the "statutory scheme of stock corporation manage-
ment" as exemplified by statutory requirements of a mere two-thirds
vote or majority vote for matters like changing the capitalization, disso-
2Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945). Another
by-law, requiring unanimity to amend the by-laws, was upheld.
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lution upon deadlock, 3 etc. Unanimity for election of directors was
held to violate a statute for election of directors by plurality vote. Una-
nimity for directors' actions was denounced as unworkable. (Query:
Is it substantially more unworkable in a close corporation than a una-
nimity agreement among partners? Was the court thinking too much,
and unnecessarily, of publicly held corporations?)
2. In Kaplan v. Block,4 the associate who claimed to be the secretary-
treasurer brought an action to compel his readmittance to that office on
the ground that his removal therefrom by the directors was in violation
of a charter provision that made directors' action binding only if ratified
by all the shareholders. He failed; the court held that the charter pro-
vision was invalid. Besides pointing out that such a requirement taken
literally would enable one of the associates to make away with the cor-
porate assets without redress (an over-argument) and that if the pro-
visions were upheld one shareholder could even prevent the corporation
from going out of business (which, if not an over-argument, at least
shows that there ought to be an appropriate dissolution provision in the
corporation statutes if a minority is going to be given veto power), the
court dropped a remark that makes dubious any veto arrangement be-
tween owners of an incorporated partnership: "Corporations were in-
vented to circumvent the unity required in partnerships. '4 a (An obser-
vation that shows the need of further legislative and judicial thinking
about close corporations.)
3. Three associates want to open a restaurant. They need more
capital and approach Nickolopoulos. He says that he will come in for
one-fourth of the shares but that he is to have a 50% vote both at share-
holders' meetings and at directors' meetings, despite his mere one-fourth
ownership. This is agreeable to everybody and they so agree in writing,
making it clear that this is what they want regardless of anything to the
contrary in the charter. In a suit to declare the validity of the agreement,
it was held invalid, because such a side agreement on the voting rights
of shareholders was not according to the scheme of things in the corpora-
tion statutes, which contemplate that the charter or by-laws is the place
for voting rights provisions; further, said the court, this secret arrange-
ment might fool and hurt outsiders. 5 (But ihis was a fight among the
' The court could very well have adopted a different approach, vig., that there
are certain transactions for which the Legislature intended a bare majority to have
power to act, as for example dissolution for deadlock (where there is a special rea-
son for so construing the dissolution statute), leaving other matters to be fixed as
the parties may desire, and that a judicial declaration of validity or invalidity of
the unanimity by-law would have to turn on a consideration of the specific act of
by-law violation.
'183 Va. 327, 31 S. E. 2d 893 (1944).
"I d. at 335, 31 S. E. 2d at 896 (1944).
'Nicholopoulas v. Sarantis, 102 N. J. Eq. 585, 141 Atl. 722 (Ct. of Err, and
App. 1928).
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insiders; there was no occasion to determine the arrangement's effec-
tiveness by considering its validity or invalidity as to outsiders.6)
In each of the three above cases, the arrangement between the parties
was a perfectly reasonable one from a business point of view. Further-
more, it is submitted, they had a perfectly legitimate objective: through
the corporate form to have essentially a partnership with limited lia-
bility. Why shouldn't they be allowed to get the benefits of a corpora-
tion and yet stick to partner-like arrangements among themselves? If
one wants to make the point that limited liability should be granted only
to attract capital from the public, and has no business in a close corpora-
tion, that is another matter. But there's no point in granting limited
liability to a close corporation and yet require it to adopt the mechanisms
of representative government. Just whom do you protect by holding
that to get limited liability the two associates must conform their set-up
to one more appropriate for General Motors? Not creditors, for the trap-
pings of representative government do not perform the function of
creditor protection. (Creditor protection lies in the rules about divi-
dend restrictions, capital impairment, watered stock, etc., none of which
protective features would be endangered by the quasi-partnership ar-
rangements above illustrated.) Not the "outside world" dealing with
the corporation, since they are protected by doctrines of apparent author-
ity not effected by secret arrangements between the shareholders. Not
the State who, be it conceded, as an interest in the success of business
enterprises; one must not overlook that these associates whose pocket-
books are most directly concerned are fully as interested in their own
success as the State is. All you achieve by invalidating their incorpo-
rated-partnership arrangement is to enable the senior partner (or a
combination of the majority-shares partners) to welch on the agreement
and to replace the theoretical democratic ideal of representative govern-
ment by a dictatorship of the 51 per cent shareholder. Absent a valid
arrangement to the contrary, the "senior partner" in an incorporated
partnership is in position to elect his own board and that board in turn
is free (within the elastic limits of fiduciary duties) to choose the work-
ing personnel, fix the salaries, determine dividend policy, issue additional
shares and fix the issue price thereof and, in general, substantively to
affect the interests of the junior associate or associates. In a nutshell,
Family A with 51% ownership of a close corporation can live in luxury
off a profitable business while Family B starves with 49%.
0 Compare the sounder approach in Kantzler v. Benzinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N. E.
874 (1905), upholding an agreement among all the shareholders that the plaintiffs
should have the offices of president, secretary and treasurer for five years at a
specified salary and should have certain controls as officers, wherein the court met
the argument about invalidity as against outsiders by saying: "It will be time
enough to consider the rights of subsequent stockholders and creditors of the cor-
poration when they are before us complaining." Id. at 600, 73 N. E. at 878.
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
True, under the corporation law of almost any state a protective
veto arrangement freezing the status quo can be worked out in a
2-man corporation as follows: have the charter classify the stock into
two classes, each class regardless of size to elect one-half of the directors
and to vote by class on all matters submitted to shareholders' vote; have
the by-laws require a majority of the full board of directors for a quo-
rum; then be sure not to attend a meeting of directors unless the full
number of directors elected by your class of shares are to be there. (Per-
haps the statutes or decisions of a particular state reveal that other
possible vetoes can be worked out, e.g., high vote requirements for
shareholders' and directors' action, etc.) 7 Yet a mere freeze of the status
quo may not be what the partners want; at the beginning of their venture,
while all is yet harmony, they may want to agree on positive action, such
as disbursement of a designated percentage of net profits unless periodi-
cally waived. But the moment they venture into the area of making such
positive managerial decisions by pre-arrangement (or, indeed even in
making veto arrangements merely by agreement and not left-handedly by
classification of shares and quorum-blocking by-laws) they are skating
on thin ice.8 They never know when a court is going to say: "Our
statutes contemplate that the affairs of a corporation shall be managed by
a board of directors and you have no business invading their jurisdiction."
True, in some states you can cut into the directors' managerial province
a bit if you don't go too fark-if you don't'go so far as to create a "steri-
lized board of directors."10 So, it is always safer to specify certain
matters as to which the rights of thd parties are as provided by agree-
ment rather than to rely on a sweeping "sterilization" of the board by
requiring (whether by charter, by-law or otherwise) unanimous board
action for all matters or that all board actions must be approved by all of
the shareholders. 1 Even so, you can't be sure; in one case even as spe-
cific-a matter, in a unanimous agreement among the shareholders, as the
continued employment of the plaintiff shareholder as treasurer at a speci-
Query: would the numerically smaller class be able to block action by the
numerically bigger class of shares under a statute like the present N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-165 relating to mergers, which permits a merger upon vote of "a majority of
the outstanding shares entitled to vote"? Arguably, that means to throw all out-
standing shares into one class for this voting purpose, regardless of what the
charter says. (Although this writer believes otherwise.) At any rate, a veto power
on the board of directors (say, by giving each of two classes of shares the right to
elect one half of the directors) would apparently enable one class to block a merger
under present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165.
8 See O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of
Special Charter and By-law Proviions, 18 LAw & CONT. PROB. 451 (1953).
' Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 199 N. E. 641 (1936).
10 Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918) ; McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934) ; Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S. E.
2d 893 (1944).
" Compare the cases cited supra notes 2, 9, 10.
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fled salary per year was held invalid ;12 in another case, a unanimous
agreement among the shareholders that one of them was to be general
manager removable only by unanimous consent was held invalid.' 3
It is submitted that there is little force in the argument, popularized
by the oft-cited New Jersey case of Jackson v. Hooper, 4 that the asso-
ciates (two, in that case) in an incorporated partnership forego all
the rights, duties and obligations of partners when they form a corpora-
tion and become its shareholders and "cannot be partners inter sese and a
corporation to the rest of the world."'15 There is a certain verbal plausibil-
ity and superficial attractiveness in such a pronouncement, but nothing
more.25a Indeed, that philosophy is apparently now rejected even in the
home state of Jackson v. Hooper.16 Further, insofar as the Benintendil-7
case in New York may have reflected, such philosophy, the Legislature
promptly responded with a statute that legalized the very kind of una-
nimity requirement, for shareholders' votes and directors' action, which
the New York court had invalidated. 8
1" McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934). Except for the
fact that the agreed employment of the shareholder in question was perhaps unlaw-
ful by statute because of his position as a city magistrate, the case is not easy to
reconcile with the same court's decision a few years later in Clark v. Dodge, 269
N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936), s=pra note 9.
1" People v. Pyle, 235 Ill. App. 532 (1924). Cf. Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill.
App. 343 (1926), granting temporary injunction against breach of an agreement
among all the shareholders which gave the complaining shareholder a veto power
over changes in officers or salaries and over any proposal to declare dividends or
to incur expenses.
1 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910).
5 Id. at 598, 75 Atl. at 571. As a result, despite the equal ownership of the
corporation between A and B and their agreement for equal control and their con-
duct of the corporate business for years without regard to corporate forms virtually
as partners, A was squeezed out of control when the dummy directors (into whose
names A and B had put a few shares to qualify them as directors, with the under-
standing that the dummies were to vote as directly by A and B jointly) sided with
B; the court would not grant A a dissolution for his wrongful exclusion from joint
control and participation in the business as co-owner-a remedy that would be
entirely appropriate in a partnership situation.
1L" For a more realistic view; see the healthy attitude of the court in De Boy
v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A. 2d 903 (1955) and cases there cited. The case is
noted in 69 HARv. L. REv. 565 (1956).
1" See Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N. 3. Super. 28, 97 A. 2d 180 (1953), where in
effect a requirement of unanimous consent by all of the three owners of the close
corporation for any binding act of the corporation was upheld as against the ma-
jority's attempt to increase their salaries and exclude the minority shareholder from
management. The court stated that there is no public policy which requires close
corporations to stick to the "statutory scheme of majority control" that is obliga-
ory as to public issue corporations. But for the continuation of the old attitude in
New York see Manacher v. Central Coal Co., 284 App. Div. 380, 131 N. Y. S. 2d
671 (1st Dept. 1954) af'd in a memorandum decision, 308 N. Y. 784, 125 N. E. 2d
431 (1955).
17 See supra note 2 and text thereto.
18 N. Y. STOcK CoRp. LAW, § 9. This statute does not expressly mention una-
nimity; it authorizes charter provisions prescribing a greater number than a major-
ity to effectuate corporate action. Presumably, a unanimity requirement is valid.
Also, the greater-than-majority provision must be in the charter. The court's in-
validation of the Benintendi by-laws had been based upon reasoning equally appli-
cable to charter provisions.
19561
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THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW CORPORATION LAW WITH
RESPECT TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS
North Carolina's prospective Business Corporation Act, enacted May
26, 1955 but not to become effective until July 1, 195719 (hereafter re-
ferred to as the New Business Corporation Act or the new Act) 20
rejects the philosophy, exemplified by the New Jersey case of Jackson
v. Hooper,21 that there is something reprehensible about adopting a cor-
porate form for an incorporated partnership and yet retaining a quasi-
partner relationship among the co-owners of the close corporation. This
rejection not only appears here and there in various sections but, per-
haps even more significantly, is reflected in what may be called the basic
philosophy provision relating to close corporations that are virtually
incorporated partnerships, viz., section 55-73(b) of the new Business
Corporation Act, which is as follows:
"Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are at the
time or subsequently become generally traded in the markets
maintained by securities dealers or brokers, no written agreement
to which all of the shareholders have actually assented, whether
embodied in the charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in
writing and signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to
any phase of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the manage-
ment of its business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall be
invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an
attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were
a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a manner that
would be appropriate only between partners.... A transferee of
shares covered by such agrement who acquires them with knowl-
edge thereof is bound by its provisions."
It was believed, in the drafting of the New Business Corporation
Act, that in addition to the flexibility in specific matters permitted by
other sections (later discussed herein), it was advisable to set a friendly
tone for incorporated partnership arrangements, inasmuch as in situa-
tions not anticipated in the drafting, the judicial decision in often largely
determined by the court's basic tolerance or intolerance toward partner-
like arrangements between the co-owners of the incorporated business.
It will be noted that the quoted provision takes as its standard of the
close corporation (although that term is not used and no attempt was
19 N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, C. 1371; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1 to 55-175, incl. (Vol.
2B, 1955 Cum. Supp. pp. 40-126).
"0 The law now in effect as to ordinary business corporations is N. C. GEN. STAT
§§ 55-1 to 55-183, incl., and will be referred to hereafter as the "present corporation
law."21Supra note 15. Cf. the attitude of the Maryland court in the De Boy case,
supra note 15a.
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made to define such a concept) the absence of trading in its shares in
the securities markets. A significant characteristic of the close corpora-
tion is that its shares are not the subject of general trading; this factor
is more significant than, say, its size (the Ford Motor Company was
until recently a close corporation despite its size) or the number of its
shareholders (although if they become numerous, trading in the over-
the-counter markets will inevitably follow). Someone may object to the
lack of certainty in the phrase about the shares being "generally traded"
in the markets; it is believed that the problem is largely academic, par-
ticularly in view of the fact that in the numerous litigated cases in which
the co-owners of a business have made partner-like arrangement the
"generally traded" test would have given no trouble. Furthermore, the
partners have it within their power to forestall general trading in the
shares by transfer restrictions. (See discussion infra.)
Perhaps the most important aspect of the above quoted provision is
that it is phrased in the negative and that, accordingly, flexibility in
judicial treatment is preserved. That is to say, the basic approach is:
no arrangement set out in the charter and by-laws agreed to by all the
co-owners or set out in a writing signed by all of them is invalid just
because it is a partner-like arrangement. A court may pronounce it
bad for other reasons, although presumably it would have to be some-
thing pretty serious since it was agreed to by everyone. Conversely, the
provision does not limit validation of arrangements to those that meet
the langauge of this statutory provision. So, unless the court goes out
of its way to read in a negative implication the court might still validate,
at least as against certain parties, a side agreement that has not been
signed by all, or that is not in writing, etc., as the circumstances of the
case may appear to the court to require. What the provision was meant
to do was to suggest to the counsellor a legal framework within which
partner-like arrangements having a reasonable business purpose could
be worked out with a substantial assurance of legal validity.22 Finally,
it was hoped that section 55-73(b) would be the safety valve for close
corporations in case other sections of the Act should seem to indicate,
as is almost inevitable in corporate statutes, that they were drafted with
the publicly held corporation primarily in mind and consequently in
terms not happily chosen for application to close corporations.
22 It may not be an irrelevant digression at this point to suggest that in the
typical two-man, three-man (and other few-men) arrangements for an incorporated
partnership, each party should be represented by his attorney in negotiating and
drafting the terms of the agreement. No matter how harmonious everything is in
the early honeymoon stage, it must not be overlooked that the interests of the parties
are diverse at many points and that each requires, before the arrangement is finally
cleared, a full consideration and clarification of his interests in anticipation of
future events.
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SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WITH AN EYE TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS
It might be urged that the drafting of the new Business Corporation
Act could have rested with the above discussed section 55-73(b) as the
basis for judicial acceptance of any reasonable arrangement in a close
corporation, however out of line that arrangement may be with the tra-
ditional forms, structures and mechanisms of publicly held corporations.
It was feared, however, that uncertainty might arise out of a potential
conflict between the generality of that provision and such other sectiotis
on specific matters as might seem to prescribe the rigors of representative
form of government, including the inviolability of majority rule and of
the sphere of directors' management. Further assurance was believed
advisable, as appears in provisions about to be discussed.
Director's Management of Corporate Affairs
Unlike the present corporation law23 and that of New York,24 New
Jersey2 5 and others which provide simply that "the business of every
corporation shall be managed by its directors," the New Business Cor-
poration Act provides in section 55-24(a) :
"Subject to the provisions of the charter, the by-laws or agreement
between the shareholders otherwise lawful, the business and af-
fairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors."
(Emphasis added.)
The italicized words were deliberately added to make it clear that, par-
ticularly (but not solely) in close corporations, there is no such thing
as an inviolate sphere of directors' jurisdiction into which no arrange-
ment can infringe. Under a statute without the italicized words, some
New York decisions indicate that an arrangement for a specific dividend
program is invalid, on the ground that decision about dividends is direc-
tors' business.2 6 (Query whether under this view a charter clause requir-
ing a certain percentage of the net profits to be paid out in dividends
might be invalid;-yet if that is the arrangement that the associates want,
why not let them have it?27) In the same vein, an agreement among all
the shareholders of a close theatre corporation, to which the corporation
itself was also a party, that provided for the management of the corpora-
tion's theatres by one of the parties to the agreement for a period of
nineteen years was held invalid as too deep an invasion of directors'
power and amounted to a violation of the above mentioned New York
Present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-48.2 N. Y. Gzw. Cola. LAW § 27.
N. J. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 14:7-1.
20 See Lindgrove v. Schluter & Co., 256 N. Y. 439, 176 N. E. 832 (1931) ; cf.,
Detonge v. Zentgraf, 181 App. Div. 43, 169 N. Y. S. 377 (2d Dept. 1918).
7 See Wabash Ry. Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F. 2d 335 (8th
Cir. 1925).
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statute :28 (Again one asks: if that was what the parties contracted for,
why not hold them to it? Particularly since the same end could pre-
sumably have been achieved by a long-term lease.) For similar reasons,
another New York decision held invalid a contract which contained a
provision that the management of the corporation should be in the holder
of the Class B stock and that holders of Class A stock should not inter-
fere in management either as individuals, stockholders or directors.29
Yet even in that state, as in most others, a charter can make Class A
shares non-voting and Class B shares voting, whereupon the one man
or few men who hold Class B quite obviously are in position to manage
without effective interference from Class A even if some Class A holders
are put on the board. All that a "directors must manage" type of statute
does is to put a premium on evasive techniques for close corporations.
Although the provision of the new Business Corporation Act under
discussion is not limited to dose corporations, two observations may be
made: (1) it is unlikely that publicly held corporations ever feel a strong
business need for departing from the usual directors' management set-up ;
(2) if a publicly held corporation should attempt to use an unorthodox
management set-up which does or might operate to the detriment of
shareholders, in violation of traditional ideas we have about majority
rule and representative form of government for such corporations, the
arrangement could be held invalid by a court. After all, the provision
under discussion does not say that every provision about management
of corporate affairs in charters, by-laws or side agrements shall be valid;
furthermore, let us not overlook the term "otherwise lawful" in the new
provision, which (a court could say) was apparently meant to afford
just such a safety valve.
The One-man Corporation
In a 1955 decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court Judge Barn-
hill dropped a remark which cast a bit of a cloud upon that rather com-
mon variety of the close corporation, viz, the one-man corporation. His
remark was: "Query: since McLean has acquired all of the stock of the
plaintiff, is it now a corporation?"3° The remark was dropped quite
obiter, at the very end of the opinion. When the opinion came out, the
General Statutes Commission was putting the finishing touches to the
new Business Corporation Act which had been introduced at the 1955
session of the General Assembly. In view of the fact that one-man and
the two-man corporations have become a common phenomenon of the
" Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N. Y. 174, 77 N. E.
2d 633 (1948). The case arose out of an action for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine the validity of the agreement.
"' Abbey v. Meyerson, 274 App. Div. 389, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 503 (2d Dept. 1948).
'0 Park Terrace Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N. C. 473, 478, 85 S. E. 2d
677, 580 (1955).
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twentieth century business world,31 the Commission and the drafting
committee did not take the remark too seriously. They did not, how-
ever, disregard it entirely. Accordingly, there was incorporated in the
new Act a sentence in new Section 55-8 that "Corporate existence is not
impaired by the acquisition of all the shares by one person." To make
the point doubly sure, with specific respect to limited liability, new Sec-
tion 55-53(e) makes it clear that a shareholder's otherwise limited lia-
bility is not lost "even if all the shares are owned by one person." It
was believed that this statutory language, coupled with the dispensation
(again with one-man and two-man corporations primarily in mind) in
the new Act of any requirement that the directors be shareholders 32
was sufficient to meet the seemingly mild threat in the Park Terrace case.
On a rehearing of the Park Terrace case, however, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in 1956 expanded its 1955 dictum into a considered
rationale which has caused considerable consternation in close corpora-
tion circles in North Carolina. From the present statutory provisions
prescribing three or more incorporators, requiring three or more direc-
tors and two or more officers and authorizing meetings to be called by
three shareholders and dissolution to be effected by a majority of the
shares, the court drew the conclusion that the legislative scheme does not
contemplate a one-man corporation and that when one person acquires
all the shares the corporation becomes "dormant" and "can no longer
act as a corporation." 33 This is not the place for an extended critique
of the court's rationale ;34 however, it should be noted that (1) since the
rationale is equally applicable under the statutes of nearly all other states,
if valid it would throw a serious monkey wrench into machinery long
accepted throughout the country, (2) the rationale would, if logically
31 In a recent interview between the writer and a practicing attorney in Durham,
N. C., who represents some 150 corporate clients, the attorney stated that about 25
of these are one-man corporations and that another 30% are two-man corporations;
he also stated that in his opinion his experience with these proportions is fairly
typical of that of other attorneys in North Carolina. Sometimes a few shares are
spread around the family "just for looks," but the real beneficial interest is still in
one man or two men.
One can hardly pick up the advance sheets of judicial decisions around the
country without seeing the one-man and two-man corporation in the picture. As
these lines are being written, for example, the federal advance sheets alone on the
desk show one-man (including wholly owned subsidiaries) or two-man corporations
in: Hoss v. Purington, 229 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir. 1956) ; American Trans-Ocean N.
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 229 F. 2d 97 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Lidger-
wood Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 229 F. 2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) ;
R. F. C. v. Unted Distillers Products Corp., 229 F. 2d 665 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Love v.
Irwin, 228 F. 2d 501 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Insurance Co. of North America v. Putney,
136 F. Supp. 894 (E. D. Va. 1955); Fayes, Inc. v. Kline, 136 F. Supp. 871 (S. D.
N. Y. 1955) and others.
" New Section 55-24(c).
"' Park Terrace v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 243 N. C. 595, 597, 91 S. E. 2d 584,
586 (1956).
" For discussion of the case see comments in this issue, pp. 471 and 531.
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pursued, throw doubts on even the 2-man corporation,3 5 (3) all you
achieve by this rationale is to induce resort to dummy nominee holders of
one or two shares, (4) the rationale, in those rare instances in which it
has been used in this century36 (mostly in Kentucky)3 7 has been pure
dictum or at least a clumsy device for reaching a decision amply support-
able on other grounds ;38 and (5) even more disconcerting than applica-
tion of the rationale to future transactions (avoidable by proper planning)
is the retroactive effect of the rationale. Suffice it to say that the attitude
which the court has displayed will now make it necessary to incorporate
dearer and stronger provisions in the new Act, including those of a cura-
tive nature with respect to corporate activities of one-man and two-man
corporations which have occurred before the new Act goes into effect,
so as to assure the legitimacy of such corporations, old and new, and of
their otherwise valid activities. Efforts along that line are now under
way.
Perhaps these efforts should even include reexamining the propriety
of the new Act's requirement of three or more persons to form"9 a cor-
poration, as well as of three or more directors.40  There is actually no
good reason for these requirements, 4 1 and they respresent no conscious
' Indeed, the Court said in the Park Terrace rehearing, supra note 33:
"Thus the concept that a corporation is a combination of three or more
persons who may operate as a legal entity when chartered so to do threads
its way through the cited and practically every other section of our law on
corporations. General Statutes, ch. 55. No lesser number will suffice."
243 N. C. at 597, 91 S. E. 2d at 586.
" In general, one has to go back to the 1890's and 80's (or earlier) to find sug-
gestions that corporate existence is "suspended" or is "in abeyance" upon acquisi-
tion of all of the shares of one person. See First Nat. Bank v. Winchester, 119
Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898) ; Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21
S. W. 531 (1893) ; Geo. T. Stagg Co. v. Taylor, 95 Ky. 651, 27 S. W. 247 (1894) ;
Swift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534 (1886). Cf. Newton Mfg. Co. v. White,
42 Ga. 148 (1871) ; Russell v. McClellan, 14 Pick. 63 (Mass. 1833). See also
Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249 19 N. E. 342 (1889). See next footnote for
twentieth century Kentucky cases.
" Russell Lumber & Supply Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 262 Ky. 388, 90 S. W. 2d
372 (1936) ; Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S. W. 2d 703 (1934).
" Thus, in the Russell case, supra, note 37, where the sole shareholder allowed
another concern to use the corporate name and led the plaintiff to believe that notes
executed in that name were authorized notes of the corporation, the corporation
was, justly enough, held liable on those notes. For a court to resort to "merging
the identity" of the shareholder and the corporation because of "suspended anima-
tion" (the court's language) serves only to befuddle the law. In the Hawley case,
supra, note 37, despite the Court's repetition of the "suspension" formula, what was
actually held was that the corporation's properties could not be seized to satisfy
the debts of the sole shareholder.
"' New Section 55-6.
40 New Section 55-25 (a).
41 Compare the answer of Mr. Paul Carrington, one of the draftsmen of the new
Texas Business Corporation Act, when asked this question in the panel discussion
on corporation law at the Legal Institute held at the University of Arkansas School
of Law, September 29-October 1, 1955: "Why didn't Texas permit one man to
incorporate like Wisconsin"? Mr. Carrington's answer:
"We debated it and personally I would say that from the standpoint of cor-
porate law I don't see any real objection why we could not permit it. We
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policy against one-man or two-man corporations. There was discussion
in the General Statutes Commission about permitting a corporation to
be formed by one person (or more) and to have less than three directors
but it was felt that (1) while we have all come to accept one-man owner-
ship of the shares some persons (including some in the Legislature!)
might shake their heads out of sheer tradition over actually forming a
corporation with just one man signing all the papers; (2) no real diffi-
culty seems to be encountered in getting persons to act as incorporators
or directors and (3) other safeguards exist for not letting the dummy
directors run wild. Thus, one such safeguard was worked out by a new
provision which permits the majority shareholders (unless the charter
or by-laws otherwise provide) to remove the entire board or any indi-
vidual director, with or without cause.42 So, if the sole shareholder has
put in himself, his wife and son-in-law as directors, he is fairly protected
against the possibility that the wife and son-in-law will gang up on him
and have a field day at his expense until the next annual meeting.
(Ordinarily majority shareholders have to take such removal action at
a meeting but there again the new Business Corporation Act, anticipating
the concentration of shareholdings, provides that shareholders' action
ordinarily required to be taken at a meeting can be taken by simply filing
with the secretary of the corporation a writing signed by all the share-
holders setting forth the shareholders' action.43 Presumably all the the
sole shareholder need do is to sign and deliver a written statement to the
Secretary to the effect that "A and B are hereby removed as directors."
Or, if he is the Secretary, presumably he need merely inform the in-
terested parties of his action.)
Permission of High Vote and High Quorum Requirements; Herein of
Unanimity.
Among the devices which have been used in incorporated partnerships
to avoid the unsuitability of plain majority rule are charter or by-law
provisions requiring more than a majority of directors or shares to be
present to form a quorum for a valid meeting or requiring more than a
bare majority to take action at a meeting-even to the point of requiring
unanimity.44 Under the corporation statutes of many states, drafted
decided that it was an innovation that had not been tested, that the general
historical idea of having at least three people was pretty well embedded in
everyone's minds. We raised the question at institutes and found most every-
body willing to go along with the minimum of three incorporators and a
minimum of three directors."
Panel on Arkansas Corporation Law, 10 ARx. L. REv. 46, 47 (1956).
"New Section 55-27(f).
"New Section 55-63(c).
"" See in general O'Neal, Gim'ng Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Deci-
sions: Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW AND CONT. PROD.
451 (1953).
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with an eye to publicly held corporations, these requirements have some-
times been upset by courts who saw, or professed to see, in the statutes
in question a policy against such requirements. The unanimity require-
ments in particular have had rough sledding. 45 True, one finds in cor-
poration laws generally a provision to the effect that the charter may
contain, in addition to prescribed items, any provision for the regulation
of the affairs and the conduct of the business of the corporation ;46 but
that provision cannot be relied upon to validate the challenged high-
majority or unanimity requirements. 47 Presumably, a similar statute
seemingly giving wide scope for insertion of any desired provisions in
by-laws would be no more effective. Conceivably, in the cases where
unanimity requirements were invalidated, the junior associate holding,
say, 40% of the voting shares, might have fared better, at least so far
as a veto power over shareholders' action is concerned, under a provision,
in charter or by-laws, requiring a 65% vote to take shareholders' action.
But one cannot be sure.48  Likewise, the junior might have succeeded
in achieving veto power over directors' action by an arrangement (per-
haps by cumulative voting or by division of shares into classes with the
right of each class to elect directors) whereby he would have, say, two
men on a five-man board under a charter or by-law requiring board
action to be taken by four directors out of the five-man board. One finds
no cases that actually invalidate a high-voting requirement for directors
although the language in some of the cases adverse to unanimity require-
ments in charters or by-laws suggests that the court might not have taken
kindly even to a mere high-vote requirement, wholly aside from the fact
that some statutes might be viewed as forbidding requirements that set
a higher vote than that prescribed by statute.49
The new Business Corporation Act, not content with the broad quasi-
partnership tolerance expressed in new Sec. 55-73(b) previously dis-
cussed (and which per se might support a unanimity requirement in a
close corporation), would provide with respect to directors' action, that
a majority can act "'unless the act of a greater number is required by the
" See cases supra notes 2, 4, 14.
E.g., the present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2.
The corporation statutes of Virginia have long contained such a provision(very much like North Carolina's present G. S. § 55-2) but nevertheless the una-
nimity requirement was stricken down, without even mentioning this statutory
provision, in Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va.' 327, 31 S. E. 2d 893 (1944).
"In Eisenstadt Bros. v. Eisenstadt, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 12 (Sup. Ct., Spec. T.,
Queens Co. 1949), where each of the three shareholders held one-third of the shares,
the court nvalidated a by-law requiring a 90% vote for shareholders' action, saying
that such a by-law is just as objectionable as the one requiring 100% in the Benin-
tendi case, supra n. 2. But cf. Kronenberg v. Sullivan County Steam Laundry Co.,
91 N. Y. S. 2d 144 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co., 1949).
"' For example, it is by no means clear that the statutory requirements for
directors' action or shareholders' action under present N. C. G. S. 55-165 for con-
solidation or merger could be increased by charter or by-law provisions. See supra
note 7.
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charter or the by-laws." 50 It is not believed that a court would construe
this to mean that the greater numbef must still be less than the full
board. Similarly with respect to shareholder action the new Act would
permit the charter to require (except in situations where the new Act
expressly makes this statutory provision inapplicable) the "concurrence
of a greater proportion of the votes" than otherwise would be required.r'
One doubts that a court would see in this a prohibition against a unanim-
ity requirement, particularly in light of the quasi-partnership provision,
new Section 55-73(b), previously discussed. Likewise with respect to
quorum requirements, the new Act would permit the charter or the by-
laws to require "a greater number" than the majority of the directors ;62
and as to shareholders' meetings, a majority of the voting shares would
constitute a quorum "unless otherwise provided in this chapter or in the
charter or in the by-laws. ' 53 With the latter provision compare the
present law, which apparently forbids the by-laws to require more than
a majority of the shares for a quorum. 4 As a practical matter, it is
preferable to resort to a high vote requirement than to a high-quorum 5
High vote requirements for shareholders and directors may need to
be buttressed by appropriate charter or by-law provisions that protect
against increases in the number of shares or of directors that would
circumvent the high vote requirement. The new Act lends itself readily
to such protective provisions by its express recognition of the validity
of restrictions that in turn require a high vote to amend the charter 0 or
the by-laws ;r7 it also affords a mechanism for filling vacancies on the
board, from death or other causes, by those interests in the corporation
who were represented by the erstwhile director. 8 The issuance of shares
for property or services without pre-emptive rights can be forbidden or
qualified by appropriate charter provisions.5sa Further buttressing all
this stands Section 55-73(b), previously discussed, relating to quasi-
partnership arrangements in close corporations.
It may be asked: is it wise to permit high quorum or voting require-
SoNew Section 55-28(d). " New Section 55-66(b).
"New Section 55-28(d). "New Secton 55-65(a).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27. Query: would the court see in this section of the
present law a policy against a high quorum requirement set forth in the charter?
" See O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use
of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONT. PROB. 451, 464 (1953).
"New Section 55-100(b) (3) states that the charter may require more than
the usual majority vote "either for all amendments or for a specific amendment."
"¢ New Section 55-16(b) permits charter or by-law provisions that require more
than the usual majorities (or directors or shareholders, as the case may be) for
amending the by-laws.
"New Section 55-27 not only permits the charter or the by-laws to prescribe
the filling of vacancies but also contemplates, in subsection (d), that vacancies of
directors elected by a particular class shall be filled by the remaining directors
elected by that class. Subsection (f) carries on with this idea by preventing one
class of shareholders from removing directors elected by another class.
... New Section 55-56(c).
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ments for corporations without specifically limiting that device to close
corporations? In publicly held corporations these devices, if available,
might be used to perpetuate the management or otherwise defeat the will
of the majority shareholders. The new Business Corporation Act does
not expressly restrict the use of high vote and high quorum to close
corporations; to have worked out a set of distinctions and restrictions
appropriate to those distinctions would have been a hazardous task of
drafting. Accordingly, the language used appears to be applicable to all
corporations, 9 but this was done in the belief that (1) publicly held
corporations typically do not resort to high vote or high quorum pro-
visions and (2) if a publicly held corporation should adopt such a pro-
vision that violates traditional ideas of what is appropriate for such
corporations, our courts would-go behind the literal language of the Act
and find reasons for not giving effect to the charter or by-law provision
in question under the special circumstances of the case before the court.
Deadlock and Dissolution
One of the safety valves in a partnership is that when things get to
an impasse, a partner can always bring about a dissolution; even if the
partnership term has not expired, application for dissolution may be
made to a court "when a partner so conducts himself in matters relating
to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business in partnershp with him," 60 or even when "other circum-
stances render a dissolution equitable." 61  If worse comes to worse, a
partner even has the power wrongfully to dissolve if he wishes to take
the chance of paying damages for his breach of the partnership contract
and, under the Uniform Partnership Act, of being bought off by the
aggrieved partner at an amount found by the court to be the fair value
of his interest, minus the damages caused by his wrongful dissolution.62
In a partnership, then, even the junior partner has it within his power to
cut the Gordion knot of friction, dissension, suspicion and deadlock.
It would be a serious matter to give to associates in close corporations
a partner-like veto through statutory tolerance of unanimity require-
ments, high vote and high quorum requirements and other partner-like
co-control features and yet, despite the deadlocks thereby arising, to pro-
"' As in the Model Business Corporation Act prepared by the Committee on Cor-
porate Laws of the American Bar Association. See American Law Institute, Model
Business Corporation Act (revised 1953) § 30 (quorum of shareholders), § 136
(vote of shareholders), § 37 (quorum of directors).
"0 UNIFORM PARTNaRSip AcT, § 32(1) (d). Strife, mutual lack of confidence
and constant friction over not only serious matters but even minor matters which
in the aggregate make co-operation impossible would seem to make partnership
dissolution available. See Owen v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 2d 147, 119 P. 2d 713 (1941)
Ferrick v. Barry, 320 Mass. 217, 68 N. E. 2d 690 (1946).
"
1 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 32(1) (f).
"UNIFORM PART-ERSHIP ACT, § 38(2) (b). See Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal.
App. 2d 615, 254 P. 2d 919 (1953).
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vide no "out," by dissolution or otherwise. Here again, traditionally
state corporation laws, drafted with the publicly held corporation in
mind, have until relatively recent years overlooked the close corporation's
dissolution problem. In the publicly held corporation, there is no prob-
lem of friction leading to deadlock; even with cumulative voting, a
majority of the directors are elected periodically by majority vote of the
shares voting, and if a particular director turns out to be a friction maker,
he is simply dropped from the slate for reelection-and that's that unless
he wants to start a proxy fight. Small wonder, than, that many state
corporation laws in their dissolution provisions have gone no further
than to set forth a procedure of "voluntary" dissolution (usually, by
directors' recommendation of dissolution followed by shareholders' ma-
jority vote63 or procedures of "involuntary" dissolution for insolvency
or abuse of corporate powers, occasionally with power in a prescribed
percentage of the shares to apply for a dissolution for some degree or
other of unprofitableness and non-payment of dividends. 4 Under such
a statutory scheme, the traditional view perhaps is that a court (per-
haps even when faced with an incorporated partnership which presents
that friction, strife and deadlock which would justify a partnership dis-
solution) lacks power to decree a dissolution except upon statutory
grounds.6 5 True, this view is losing ground,60 and some courts have
granted dissolution for deadlock without aid of statute.0 7 State statutes
have increasingly tended to include deadlock as one of the grounds of
dissolution, although, as one writer points out, some courts have even
under those statutes tended towards conservative interpretation and to
view corporate existence as a "sacred cow" to which homage must be
rendered.68
The new Business Corporation Act does not view corporate existence
as a sacred cow-at least it does not so view its going-concern operation.
Besides enacting a catch-all provision to the effect that the superior court
has power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation when
liquidation "is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or
See present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-121.
' See present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.
e See Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 313, 315-6 (1950) pointing out that although there
are no North Carolina holdings on the question, there is a lone statement in a dis-
senting opinion, in keeping with the old tradition, that "in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, only the State which created the corporation can sue to
dissolve it." Clarkson J., in Kistler v. Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 205 N. C. 809,
814, 172 S. E. 373, 375 (1933). The thought is, apparently, that only the Legisla-
ture can prescribe how to create a corporation, hence only the Legislature can pre-
scribe how to put an end to it.
o See note cited supra note 65.
Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pullam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P. 2d 975 (1948), and
see cases there cited; BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1946) 715; STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1949) 956-6.
" Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, 19 U. oF CHIc. L. REV. 778
(1952).
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interests of the complaining shareholder,"6 the new Act has its eye on
close corporations when it provides for liquidation in an action by a
shareholder when a deadlock among directors cannot be broken by share-
holders (which may be the case not only in even-split situations but also
under high vote or unanimity requirements in charter and by-laws) and
business can no longer be conducted advantageously to all or when share-
holders are deadlocked and therefore unable to elect successor direc-
tors.70 It should be pointed out, however, that these new provisions
merely give the court power to liquidate; whether it exercises that power
will be determined by how badly the situation calls for that rather drastic
remedy.71 Indeed, the inability of shareholders to muster enough votes
to change the existing directorate may have been exactly what the in-
corporated partners sought to achieve by the particular set of charter or
by-law provisions or distribution of shares among them; that deadlock
in electing new and different directors does not per se call for liquidation.
Besides the foregoing liquidation-for-deadlock provisions, which fol-
low the Model Business Corporation Act,72 the new Act, again with its
eye on the close corporation, goes a step further and authorizes the asso-
ciates to write their own ticket with respect to liquidation of the business
by inserting either in the charter or in other written agreement the terms
upon which the complaining shareholder is entitled to dissolution, which
may be either at will or upon the occurrence of same designated event.
73
In the absence of such a statute there seems to be a question whether a
court will give effect to dissolution agreements even if all the share-
holders are parties to it,7 4 although here again the new Act's quasi-
partnership Section 55-73(b) previously discussed, might per se uphold
such an agreement. Under the new Act, then, the parties in a close cor-
poration can work out, if they so wish, a right of liquidation upon death
of A or B, upon failure to elect the persons selected by A to two posts
on the board of directors, etc. Just as partners can beforehand agree on
an event of dissolution, so can incorporated partners so agree for liquida-
tion under the new Act.
There would seem, then, to be no reason under the new Act for a
court to approach the problem of liquidation of the business of a close
"New Section 55-125 (a) (4).
" New Section 55-125 (a) (1) and (2).
"' See Application of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 604 (1st Dept.
1949) under a dissolution-for-deadlock statute. (Relief denied; although the situa-
ton literally met the statutory deadlock conditions, the business was not seriously
affected.)
7-MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr, supra note 59, §90(a) (1) and (3),
"New Section 55-125 (a) (3).
7'Cf. views of Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreentents in Closely Held Corpora-
tions, 59 YALE L. J. 1040, 1047 (1950) with Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate
Existence, 19 U. CHIC. L. REv. 778, 792 (1952). A few years later, Hornstein
viewed the problem as unsettled. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated
Partnership, 18 LAw & CONT. PRoB. 435, 448 (1953).
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corporation with substantially more conservatism than it would show in
dissolving a partnership, free from any carry-over of the "sacred cow"
tradition of corporate existence.
There is one further aspect of this probelm which the new Act might
have gone into but which it avoids: it makes no attempt to confer a right
upon the majority shareholder or shareholders to buy out a shareholder
seeking a liquidation and to establish a mechanism for appraisal of shares
in such event. The matter is not an easy one to work out, although two
states have statutes to that effect,7 5 which statutes, unlike the Uniform
Partnership Act, are not aimed simply at buying out the associate who
brings about a wrongful dissolution. It is not easy to draft an appro-
priate buy-out provision in an equal-ownership case or one which does
not lend itself to being used as a pressure device. Since the effective date
of the new Act was deliberately postponed to July 1, 1957, in order to
get ideas for improvement of the Act, someone may yet come up with a
suggestion on this point for the 1957 General Assembly.
Keeping the Close Corporation Closed; Share Transfer Restrictions.
The owner-managers of an incorporated partnership are as much con-
cerned with the delectits personae as are out-and-out partners and hence
are likely to make arrangements to restrict share holdings to acceptable
persons. Despite its awareness of the problems of the close corporation,
the new Business Corporation Act has no section specially devoted to
restrictions on the transferability of shares. Primarily, the reason for
this seeming neglect is that North Carolina case law on this matter fur-
nishes a solid basis for the adoption by incorporated partners of the kind
of reasonable restriction for which they have any good business reason.
In the leading case of Wright v. Iredell Telephone Co.,76 the court up-
held a charter provision to the effect that shares could not be sold or
transferred until the sale or transfer was reported to the directors and
approved by them; accordingly, a purchaser who bought under a non-
complying sale was held not entitled to be registered as a shareholder
and to have a stock certificate issued to him in his name. The court
demonstrated a commendable liberality in two respects. In the first
place, it upheld a restriction that went beyond the customary "first re-
fusal" condition that requires the shares first to be offered to the corpora-
tion or to the other shareholders before being sold to outsiders. A
number of courts, however tolerant they might be of a "first refusal"
type of restriction, would balk at a "directors' consent" type,77 on the
7 CALIF. CoRp. CODE §§ 4658, 4659; W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3093 (1949).
182 N. C. 305, 108 S. E. 744 (1921).7Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Machine Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 256, 86 Atl. 1026
(1913); Feckheimer v. National Exchange Bank of Norfolk, 79 Va. 80 (1884);
BALLANINE, CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1946) 778 and cases there cited; Cataldo,
Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Close Corporations, 37 VA. L. REv. 229 (1951).
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ground that this puts the transfer of one man's property at the mercy of
another man's veto, and one that might be exercised arbitrarily at that.78
(However, the actual facts in the Wright case were that the directors
did not simply withhold their consent to the the transfer; rather, they
came up with approved persons who were willing to buy the shares at
the price that the shareholder was getting from the unapproved pur-
chaser. To be on the safe side, then, the transfer restriction in a North
Carolina corporation should be phrased in terms of a "first refusal" or,
if not, the persons having the veto power should produce a standby pur-
chaser.) In the second place, the corporation in the Wright case was
not merely an incorporated partnership; apparently the shares in the
corporation (a local telephone company) were rather widely held in the
community; still, the purpose of the restriction was reasonable enough:
the local citizens did not want to run the risk that the shares would be
bought up by a telephone "system" which (experience had led them to
believe) would result in higher rates. It would seem, then, that in an
incorporated partnership the North Carolina courts would be even more
tolerant of transfer restraints and would be inclined to accept a restraint
(at least a "first refusal" restraint) without further inquiry into the pur-
pose of the restraint, reserving inquiry into proper purpose for corpora-
tions that are something more than an incorporated partnership, as in
the Wright case. (As a practical matter, a "first refusal" restraint,
with rights of purchase in the case of transfer by operation of law, is all
that the incorporated partners really need.)
Perhaps in view of the fact that the restraint in the Wright case was
found in the charter, the new Act should have taken the occasion to
clarify the point, not clear at common law, whether an otherwise toler-
able restraint can be stated in the by-laws if not stated in the charter,
since at least the old cases seemed to be more tolerant of restrictions
placed in the charter than of those placed in the by-laws.79 In a mild
sort of way, however, the new Act contains language which indicates
that the by-laws are a proper repository for matters relating to transfer
of shares; new Section 55-16(c) states that the by-laws "may contain
any provisions for the regulation and management of the affairs of the
corporation, including the transfer of its shares, not inconsistent with
the law or the charter." (Emphasis added.) Similar language has on
occasion been held a sufficient basis for a by-law restricting transfers ;80
and in those cases where such a statute was held not to authorize the
by-law restriction, the decision seems to reveal rather an antipathy to-
" However, O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corpora-
tons: Planning and Drafting, 65 HAuv. L. REv. 773 (1952) makes the point (p. 780)
that the recent cases tend to uphold even "consent" restrictions.
" See cases and writers cited supra notes 77, 78.
o Nickelson v. Franklin Brewery Co., 82 Ohio 94, 91 N. E. 991 (1910).
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ward the restraint (unlike the North Carolina court's attitude) than an
objection to placing the restrictions in the by-laws.8 ' Any argument
based on lack of notoriety of the by-laws, as distinguished from the
fiction of "constructive notice" of the charter, would seem to lack force
in view of the fact that purchasers without notice of the restriction would
get the benefit under the new Act, as they do under the present law, 2
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act provision requiring the restriction to
be stated on the share certificate. Incidentally, the very fact that this
provision of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act refers to transfer restric-
tions "by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise," is
a further indication that if there is anything wrong with a transfer re-
straint it is not because the restraint is in the by-laws. Still, the careful
lawyer will probably prefer to put the restriction in the charter. Perhaps
it may be advisable to suggest an amendment that would insert in above-
quoted Section 5 5-16(c) of the new Act, after the words "including the
transfer of its shares," the words "and restrictions thereon"; it is hard
to see how that could do any harm, even if the foregoing discussion
suggests that this is unnecessary.
There is a technical point on which the new Act, while adequate for
the really close corporation (the incorporated partnership) could perhaps
be improved with respect to facilitating the operation of stock transfer
restrictions. That is, it should perhaps be made clear that a corporation
may properly acquire its own stock under a first refusal restriction. The
new Act's approach (Section 55-52) to the problem of a corporation
acquiring its own stock is to enumerate the kinds of cases in which that
can be done. The enumeration does not specifically mention acquisi-
tions pursuant to transfer restrictions. In a really close corporation, this
presents no great problem since new Section 55-52(c) (3) expressly per-
mits a corporation to buy shares (out of surplus) from any shareholder
upon the vote of the majority of the other shares. (And if the holders
of all the other shares consent in writing, no meeting is necessary under
new Section 55-63(c) relating to shareholders' actions without meet-
ings.) Those provisions seem adequate to take care of the few-man
corporations, even aside from the quasi-partnership section, Section 55-
73(b), previously discussed. But for the more widely held corporation
it would appear that there should be added in the appropriate place (say,
in an additional paragraph in subsection (c) of Section 55-52), an ex-
press provision permitting a corporation to purchase its own shares
"' See Kretzer v. Cole Brothers Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S. W.
1066 (1916); Steele v. Farmers & Merchants Mutual Telephone Ass'n, 95 Kan.
580, 148 Pac. 661 (1915).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-95, being Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act.
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"from any shareholder in the exercise of the corporation's right to pur-
chase the shares pursuant to restrictions upon the transfer thereof."
Intramural Informality in Close Corporations
The really close corporation, particularly the "incorporated hot dog
stand," is notorious for its persistent flaunting of all those formalities
and ceremonials dear to the heart of the true corporation lawyer.83 Now,
the law maker (be he legislator or judge) can do one of two things when
faced with this stubborn fact of life within the close corporation family:
(1) he can threaten and beat the perpetrators of this corporate infor-
malism with laws designed primarily for publicly held corporations, on
the theory that what is good for General Motors is good for Hot Dog,
Inc., hoping that the threat or the beating or both will serve as a warning
to all corporate parties in the future to show good corporate manners,
even if in the course of the beating some innocent by-standers catch
some of the stray blows; (2) he can recognize this fact as one of the
personality traits of the close corporation and try to live with it (chas-
tizing the culprit when his disregard of proprieties goes beyond lack
of good corporate manners and becomes anti-social conduct to the detri-
ment of insiders or outsiders). The General Statutes Commission, after
a lively discussion, decided to adopt the second of the above positions.
This is reflected by Section 55-29 of the new Act relating to "informal or
irregular actions by directors or committees." Subsection (a) of that
section would, for example, view as board action the action taken by a
majority of the directors even without a formal meeting (or any "meet-
ing") if either written consent to the action is signed by all directors and
filed in the minute books or if all shareholders know of the action and
make no prompt objection or if the directors have, to the knowledge of
the shareholders, been accustomed to take action informally. (It is
even arguable that the requirement of shareholders' knowledge of the
directors informal habits should be eliminated.) Subsection (b) of that
same section provides that if a meeting of directors otherwise valid is
held without proper call or notice, action taken at such meeting is deemed
ratified by non-attending directors unless they file an objection promptly
after knowing about it. Some misgiving was voiced over the possibility
" To quote from Prentice-Hall, Lawyers Weekly Report: Corporation News
(Jan. 24, 1955) :
"Owners of small 'family' corporations, or 'incorporated partnerships' are
notoriously negligent in observing the legal requirements and formalities of
doing business in the corporate form. Often they are little interested in such
things as minutes, meetings and resolutions, and know nothing about such
legal rules as 'interested directors' and 'corporate opportunity'-until the day
of reckoning comes, when the 'partnership' breaks up in dispute or creditors
decide to assert their claims. Acts done informally and in complete good
faith are then tested against strict legal requirements that the parties knew
nothing about or ignored. An unhappy education results."
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that the stamp of approval would thereby be put upon laxness, leading to
even greater laxness. It was preponderantly believed, however, that
actual practices would be little affected and that the big corporations
would continue showing patrician corporate maners while the little ones
would continue in their uncouth plebian ways, but without getting worse.
The General Statutes Commission's attitude was similarly reflected
in new Section 55-63 relating to irregular meetings of shareholders and
shareholders' action without a meeting. Accordingly, subsections (a) and
(b) thereof are to the effect that a meeting of shareholders, even if held
without proper call and notice, can act as validly as if proper call and
notice were had so long as all the shareholders attend and make no
objection (and silence of the minutes prima facie establishes that no
objection was made) or if those who did not attend (there having been,
however, a quorum present) sign, before or after the meeting, a waiver or
approval of the action taken. Subsection (c) provides that written con-
sent to shareholders' action signed by all the shareholders is the equiva-
lent of action taken at a meeting.
Moreover (although this is not expressly stated), nothing in the
mentioned sections should discourage a court from validating corporate
action on the bases of such doctrines of ratification by acquiescence, dis-
interest or passivity as the court may deem appropriate for the protection
of whoever needs to be so protected. Actually, courts have frequently
tolerated departure from strict formality, particularly by close corpora-
tions, and it is doubtful that the new Act here is really making any
radical innovation.84 This is not to say, however, that anything in the
new Act condones the conduct of these who view their managerial post
as simply the occasion for running the corporate business solely for
their own benefit, in disregard of the rights of creditors or other share-
holders and who, resentful of the very existence of other interests, tend
to lapse into the frame of mind (particularly if their management has
been skillful and successful) of Louis XIV: L'6tat c'est moi. 85
"' See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1946) 123-126, 129-30, 390; STEVENS,
CORORATIONS (2d ed. 1949) 657-662.
" For example, it is by no means clear that in the case to which the Prentice-
Hall letter, supra, note 83, was addressed, what was involved was merely a lack of
formality; we futher quote from that letter:
"Robert organized and managed a family real estate development corpora-
tion. A dispute arose and Robert was held to account for these transactions(although the court stated that Robert made a 'dream come true' and that
much could be said in his defense, practically if not legally) :
"(1) Stock was issued to Robert without legal consideration (apparently,
it was felt that Robert was entitled to the stock for past and future services).
He had to choose whether to pay for the stock or have it cancelled.
"(2) Robert borrowed $40,000 from the corporation at 4Y%. He didn't
know it, but the loan was illegal and he-and the other directors-werejointly and severally liable to repay it at 6%.
"(3) The corporation conveyed some vacant lots to Robert. He built
on the lots and sold them at a profit to hinself. Because he 'diverted a cor-
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Miscellaneous
There are other points with respect to which the new Act recognizes
that the mechanisms of publicly held corporations need some flexibility
or dispensation for close corporations. For example, by new Section
55-64(d) a voting list need not be prepared for a shareholders' meeting
where, as in a close corporation, the stock records present readily show
who the shareholders are. In a similar spirit, Section 55-70 permits the
charter or the by-laws to dispense with voting inspectors at shareholders'
meetings.
A simple procedure for dissolution is provided in Section 55-117, of
practical utility to close corporations where all the shareholders are ready
to sign the written consent to dissolution. Although no similar provision
for a short form of merger was specifically provided for, as a practical
matter two or more close corporations could readily merge or consolidate
without going through the procedure of shareholders' meetings by virtue
of Section 55-63 (c), under which the written consent of all of the share-
holders of the merging or consolidating corporation can take the place
of voting at a formal meeting.
Also, it must not be overlooked that the wide freedom of dividing
shares into classes and of giving each class such voting or participating
right as may be desired (in which respect the new Act is not at all novel)
furnishes a mechanism that can be of great utility in an incorporated
partnership.
WHY NOT A SEPARATE CLOSE CORPORTION AcT?
One finds in legal writings from time to time the suggestion that
there be a separate statute for close corporations. It is pointed out that
the continental Europeans have such a system86 and so do the English
with their special provisions in the Company Act for "private com-
panies." In drafting the new Business Corporation Act, however, the
General Statutes Commission felt that a single piece of legislation could
embody the essential needs and safeguards with respect to both the
closely held and the publicly held corporation. To attempt to define
generally a category of close corporations is no easy matter. To define
such a corporation by numerical standard (say, less than 50 share-
holders) is not without difficulties, such as those raised by evasive dis-
persion or groupings of shares, repurchases of shares, etc. Moreover,
even these foreign systems are not designed to take care of that common
porate opportunity,' he had to pay the profit over to the corporation. [Mac-
lary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., Del. Ch. Ct., No. 305, 12/6/54]."
The case has since been reported in 109 A. 2d 830 (1954).
" See Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law, 18
LAW & CONT. PRoB. 546 (1953).
"' See Gower, The English Private Company, 18 LAW & CoNT. PRoB. 535 (1953).
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American phenomenon, the one-man corporation.88 Furthermore, the
proliferation of close corporations under the usual American legislative
set-up for corporations and the experience of close corporations under
that set-up, even on those occasions when their experience before the
courts has been a sad one, suggest that what is needed is not so much a
special statute for close corporations as a general awareness throughout
the corporation law of the peculiarities of the close corporation. Moreover,
experience in those few states that have what might be called a special
statute for close corporations, such as the "partnership association" (with
'limited liability) in Pennsylvania, 9 Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio,
indicate that little use is made of those statutes by co-owners of a business
who desire limited liability; instead, they consistently use the corporation
law, leaving it to counsel to work out within the corporation law some-
thing that fits their needs.90 Perhaps the reason is that those limited
liability statutes, aside from the corporation law, are ancient, skimpy
and more awkward to operate under than the corporation law; perhaps
-a good close corporation law would have had a different experience.
Still, the very fact that nobody in those states has started a strong move-
ment to modernize and perfect these other statutes for use of incorpo-
rated partnerships is suggestive in and of itself. It is also interesting to
note that the New York Law Revision Commission, faced with the dis-
content that arose as a result of the Benintendi case,91 also considered and
rejected the idea of defining the close corporation and of having either a
separate act for such corporations or a set of provisions applicable solely
to close corporations. 92  Instead they came up with a section expressly
granting authority to include high-vote and high quorum requirements
" Under the English Companies Act, 1948, for instance, if the shareholders even
in a "private company" fall below two in number, the sole shareholder loses limited
liability. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 31 (1948). By Italian law, in the case of in-
solvency the sole shareholder of a stock corporation (of the societa per azioni
type) is liable for corporate debts incurred while he was sole shareholder. Civ.
CODE, art. 2362. And as to what may be called the close corporation (in Italy, the
societa a responsabilita limitata, with "quotas" instead of shares), the very notion
.of a "societa" as well as the general legislative scheme seems to preclude a one-man
"society."
89 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 341-461 (1930). Pennsylvania also has a form of
association known as the "registered partnership," wherein all the partners have
limited liability. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 241-321. See also the "partnership
association" in Michigan, MIcH. ComP. LAws §§ 449.301 et seq. (1948) ; the "lim-
ited partnership association" in New Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:3-1 et seq.
(1940) ; the "limited partnership association" in Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE, §§ 1783.01-
08 (1954), all of which have limited liability.
" In 1952 the writer sent an inquiry to all of the graduates of the Duke Univer-
sity Law School practicing law in Pennsylvania and New Jersey to find out whether
extensive use was made of the statutes in question, in their experience. Without
exception, the answers received were to the effect that, in their experience, resort
was had always to the corporation law, never to these other statutes.
91 Supra, note 2.
9" See N. Y. LAW REv. CoMm., REPORT (1948) 385, 386. See also Israels, The
Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 488, 491 (1948).
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in corporate charters.93  Apparently a similar attitude prevailed in the
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association which
drafted the Model Business Corporation Act. 4 The European distinc-
tion between ordinary corporations and what might be called close cor-
poration (as well as the English scheme for companies, "private" or
otherwise)9 5 is addressed less to the problems of intracorporate control
and management with which American close corporations have been
greatly concerned than to the problem of protection of the investing pub-
lic-a problem which with us is met by Blue Sky Laws and, more
emphatically, by the legislation under the administration of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.9 6 All in all, it was believed that a single
North Carolina Act could meet the need of both the close and publicly
held corporation.
3N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 9.
See 8 Bits. Lawyer 33-37 (Jan. 1953).
See N. Y. LAw REv. Comm., REPORT 418-422 (1948). It is to be noted that
the English provisions relative to "private companies" are to be found not in a
separate Act for such companies but in a few provisions within the Companies Act
itself.
"r See N. Y. LAW REV. Comm., REPORT 416 (1948).
